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Beyond Aristotle:  Alternative Rhetorics and the Conflict Over 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior research has sketched out a picture in which, at least since 1960 
and continuing to the present, advocates of the differing personae, or roles, 
of the U.S. law professor have been sharply divided over such personae.
1
  
Lawyers have advocated two major personae for the law professor to 
perform.  One major persona is that of the scholar, who is a full-time 
teacher, researcher, and sometimes public servant, but who often has limited 
practical experience.
2
  The other major persona is that of the practitioner, 
who has a substantial number of years of practice at the bar and is prepared 
for hands-on lawyering instruction.
3
  At stake in this communication is the 
future of the central figure in the education of prospective lawyers, the one 
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 1. See generally Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict:  Rhetorical Constructions of the 
U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 711. 
 3. Id. at 720. 
 4. Jason Ostrom, The Competing Roles of Law Professors, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 540 (2001). 
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The lawyers who have constructed these personae generally have 
employed traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, or persuasion, a process that has 
contributed to much rhetorical clash and little rhetorical understanding.
5
  
Unfortunately, this conflict has continued to the present time without much 
improvement in the communication.  Indeed, although the lawyers have 
advanced their own positions, these lawyers generally have not listened to 
each other carefully to understand the relevant positions in the discourse,
6
 
and when the lawyers have listened at all, they have done so to point out 
why different perspectives are “wrong.”  A prediction for the future of such 
discourse was only “marginal change” at best.
7
  Because to a large extent 
this is a communication problem, the situation calls for a communication 
approach.   
Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin’s invitational rhetoric,
8
 an 
alternative to the millennia-old traditional Western concept of rhetoric as 
persuasion, is one such approach that should be of value to the lawyers 
embroiled in the ongoing conflict.
9
  This alternative approach to rhetoric 
offers the audience of the rhetoric a chance “to enter the rhetor’s world and 
to see it as the rhetor does” without the necessity of a win-lose decision, 
such as the one in a political election or a legal trial.
10
  Rather than seeking 
to change other participants, the rhetor, or communicator, seeks to help the 
other participants in the communication understand the rhetor’s 
  
 5. Pedrioli, supra note 1, at 704. 
 6.  Douglas D. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers Identify The Ideal Law Professor, 36 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 93, 106 (1986). 
 7. Id. at 106-07. 
 8. Sonja K. Foss & Cindy L. Griffin, Beyond Persuasion:  A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric, 
62 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 2, 5 (1995).   
 9. Foss and Griffin’s study has received scholarly attention and become important for a variety of 
reasons.  For example, M. Lane Bruner argued that Foss and Griffin’s study of invitational rhetoric has 
“played an important role in revealing how women have been excluded from much of traditional rhetori-
cal scholarship.”  M. Lane Bruner, Produci ng Identities:  Gender Problematization and Feminist Argu-
mentation, 32 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 185, 188 (1996).  Bruner added that the study has “contrib-
uted substantially to an understanding of the constraining and enabling features of identification practic-
es.”  Id.  Irwin Mallin and Karrin Vasby Anderson observed that the study has revived discussion about 
how modes of rhetoric can be “most productive” to the parties involved.  Irwin Mallin & Karrin Vasby 
Anderson, Inviting Constructive Argument, 36 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 120, 121 (2000).  As Mallin 
and Anderson noted, invitational rhetoric is important “because it offers a new frame of reference for 
what argument can and should accomplish [and] assigns [communicators] new responsibilities” outside 
those responsibilities of traditional rhetoric.  Id. at 124.  Because of scholarly responses like these, addi-
tional consideration of invitational rhetoric is appropriate for a more thorough understanding of how 
invitational rhetoric might be of service to human communicators.  Jeffrey Thomas Bile, Communica-
tion, Advocacy, Argumentation, and Feminisms:  Toward a Dialectical Partnership, 32 SPEAKER & 
GAVEL 55, 63 (1995).  Such communicators include lawyers who have had a difficult time communi-
cating successfully with each other. 
 10.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5. 
2012] BEYOND ARISTOTLE 921 
perspective.
11
  Then the other participants become empowered because they 
have an opportunity to express themselves while the original rhetor listens.  
Although invitational rhetoric should be helpful, invitational rhetoric is 
one important step in the ultimate suggested approach of this Article, not the 
ultimate approach itself.  In a legal field that assumes traditional rhetoric, 
invitational rhetoric alone would be inadequate. Invitational rhetoric focuses 
on the dialogue that has been missing from the communication regarding 
the construction of the law professor persona(e), but, because the legal field 
works principally with traditional rhetoric, traditional rhetoric also calls for 
some consideration.  Cooperative rhetoric
12
 embraces both the dialogue of 
invitational rhetoric and the argumentation of traditional rhetoric.
12
  
Invitational rhetoric will help develop the theoretically underdeveloped 
dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric, the dimension of cooperative 
rhetoric more needed in the ongoing conflict over the law professor 
persona(e), and cooperative rhetoric, in considering argumentation as well 
as dialogue, ultimately will be a better fit with the legal field than 
invitational rhetoric.  Invitational and cooperative rhetorics can benefit from 
each other.  Hence, the attention paid to invitational rhetoric will be 
important because this attention will develop a stronger understanding of 
cooperative rhetoric. 
Accordingly, this Article maintains that alternative rhetorics offer new 
possibilities to help improve the conflict over the persona(e) of the U.S. law 
professor.  To expand upon this perspective, the Article will begin with a 
discussion of invitational rhetoric, both defining invitational rhetoric and 
illustrating how invitational rhetoric can be helpful for lawyers presently 
involved in the conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor 
persona(e).
13
 The Article then will continue with a discussion of cooperative 
rhetoric, defining cooperative rhetoric as invitational rhetoric informs it, 
outlining the form of alternative dispute resolution known as collaborative 
law as a precedent for the implementation of cooperative rhetoric in the 
legal field, and illustrating how cooperative rhetoric can work in the conflict 
over the ideal law professor persona(e).   
  
 11.  Id. 
 12.   Scholars label this concept differently.  See infra Section III.A.  For consistency, this Article will 
employ the term cooperative rhetoric. 
 
 13.  In presenting an argument for invitational rhetoric as one tool for improving the status of the 
conflict between two major groups of lawyers, this Article will exemplify the tension between taking a 
position on invitational rhetoric and communicating in an invitational manner.  Such can be the paradox-
ical, and thus intriguing, nature of rhetoric. 
    13.   In presenting an argument for invitational rhetoric as one tool for improving the status of the 
conflict between two major groups of lawyers, this Article will exemplify the tension between taking a 
position on invitati nal rhetoric and communicating in an invitational mann r.  Such can b  the para-
doxical, and thus intriguing, nature of rhetoric. 
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II.  INVITATIONAL RHETORIC 
A.  Defining Invitational Rhetoric
14
 
Invitational rhetoric is very different from traditional Aristotelian 
rhetoric, and an understanding of the latter helps inform an understanding of 
the former.  Traditional rhetoric involves attempting to persuade an 
audience to accept an advocate’s position.  In his fourth century B.C. 
treatise On Rhetoric, Aristotle defined the term rhetoric as “an ability, in 
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”
15
  Hence, 
in a given situation a skilled advocate endeavors to find multiple modes of 
persuasion rather than just one.
16
  Much more recently, but still in the 
Aristotelian vein, Michael Leff described the term rhetoric as an endeavor 
whose goal is persuasion.
17
  As the reference to Aristotle suggests, the study 
of traditional rhetoric dates back to the ancient world, specifically to fifth 
century B.C. Athens, and ever since male Greek citizens of that era called 
upon rhetoric in the process of bringing and defending legal suits, debating 




Such traditional rhetoric involves justifying why a particular position is 
appropriate.  Today, traditional rhetoric manifests itself in political debates, 
legal trials and appeals, and advertising.
19
  Some traditional rhetorics are 
more fully supported with evidence than others.  In many rhetorical 
situations,
20
 advocates seek to change audiences to serve the advocates’ own 
ends.  One can think of politicians who want to gain or retain office, 
lawyers who want to win large contingency fees, and advertisers who seek 
to sell a seemingly endless stream of consumer products.  Not only do such 
examples of traditional rhetoric often involve justifying why a particular 
  
 14.  A previous version of this discussion of invitational rhetoric appeared in Carlo A. Pedrioli, A 
New Image in the Looking Glass:  Faculty Mentoring, Invitational Rhetoric, and the Second-Class 
Status of Women in U.S. Academia, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (2004).  The author of that article 
has retained revision and republication rights to the article. 
 15.   ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC:  A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 
1991). 
 16.   JAMES L. GOLDEN, GOODWIN F. BERQUIST, & WILLIAM E. COLEMAN, THE RHETORIC OF 
WESTERN THOUGHT 28 (6th ed. 1997). 
 17.  Michael Leff, The Habitation of Rhetoric, in ARGUMENT AND CRITICAL PRACTICES:  
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION 1, 6 (Joseph W. Wenzel ed., 
1987).  
 18.   GOLDEN, BERQUIST, & COLEMAN, supra note 16, at 6, 8. 
 19.  Id. at viii; CHARLES U. LARSON, PERSUASION:  RECEPTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5, 8 (7th ed. 
1995).   
 20.  For more on the rhetorical situation, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & 
RHETORIC 1 (1968).  For a critique of Bitzer’s argument, see Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetori-
cal Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973). 
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position is “right,”
21
 but frequently, by necessity, such examples involve 
explaining why another position is “wrong.” 
In contrast to traditional rhetoric, “[i]nvitational rhetoric is an invitation 
to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, 
immanent value, and self-determination.”
22
  Invitational rhetoric offers the 
audience a chance “to enter the rhetor’s world and to see it as the rhetor 
does.”
23
  When speaking, the rhetor, or communicator, refrains from judging 
the perspectives of other participants in the communication process, and the 
other participants attempt to refrain from judging the perspectives of the 
rhetor.
24
  Instead of seeking to change other participants, the rhetor tries to 
help the other participants understand the rhetor’s perspective.
25
  Then the 
other participants become empowered because they have a chance to 
express themselves while the original rhetor listens.   
The process, which is akin to bilateral dialogue,
26
 is about offering 
perspectives and not about telling others to take a given action or 
understand that their ideas are flawed.
27
  Because this is a process of 
rhetoric as inquiry,
28
 any change in perspective that takes place occurs when 
members of the audience choose to make such change, but do so without the 
influence of a rhetor who presses for that change.
29
  No “winner” prevails, 
and no “loser” feels the sting of defeat.  Importantly, invitational rhetoric is 
about a constructive communication process, not a specific content or a 
substantive result.  Since a prescribed content would violate the invitational 
spirit of invitational rhetoric, the exact content of the rhetoric is up to the 
invitational rhetors.  
Although invitational rhetoric will not succeed in all cases in which 
advocates employ it, when invitational rhetoric succeeds, it tends to consist 
of at least three external conditions:  safety, value, and freedom.
30
  Foss and 
Griffin have defined these conditions in the following manner:  safety as 
“the creation of a feeling of security and [absence of] danger for the 
  
 21.   JOSINA M. MAKAU & DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION:  A MODEL FOR 
DELIBERATIVE COMMUNITY 84 (2001). 
 22.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Bile, supra note 9, at 62. 
 27.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 7, 10; Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130. 
 28. Irene P. Faass, Shades of Gray:  Alternative Metaphors for Argumentation, in ARGUING 
COMMUNICATION & CULTURE:  SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE TWELFTH NCA/AFA CONFERENCE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 219, 220 (G. Thomas Goodnight ed., 2002). 
 29.   SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION:  PRESENTATIONAL SPEAKING 
FOR A CHANGING WORLD 13-14 (2003). 
 30.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10.   
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audience,” value as “the acknowledgment that audience members have 
intrinsic or immanent worth,” and freedom as “the power to choose or 
decide.”
31
  To the work of Foss and Griffin, Foss and colleague Karen A. 
Foss have added openness as a fourth condition that helps foster invitational 
rhetoric.
32
  Foss and Foss have defined openness as the process of 
“seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives as possible.”
33
 
To help foster the conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness 
that can lead to invitational rhetoric, Foss and Foss have suggested the 
process of re-sourcement, which refers to finding a new source of “energy 
and inspiration.”
34
  Re-sourcement involves disengaging oneself from an 
interaction frame of conquest or conversion of one’s audience and then 




At this point in the discussion of invitational rhetoric, another 
consideration becomes appropriate.  Although this Article has presented 
invitational rhetoric in contrast to traditional rhetoric because of a number 
of differences between the two types of rhetoric, the Article in no way 
means to imply that invitational rhetoric and traditional rhetoric are binary 
opposites.  Rather, it may be more helpful to think of any given discourse as 
situated on a continuum that ranges from invitational rhetoric to traditional 
rhetoric.  For instance, discourse may be closer to traditional rhetoric, or 
discourse may be closer to invitational rhetoric. 
In attempting to show how invitational rhetoric can work, Foss and 
Griffin have offered several examples of successful invitational rhetoric in 
differing communication situations such as interpersonal communication 
and public address situations.  One such example involved two individuals 
with drastically opposing perspectives on abortion.
36
  Encountering each 
other at an airport in New York, a woman, who favored abortion, and a 
man, who opposed abortion, began to scream at each other until they almost 
needed separation.
37
  One hour later, as the woman boarded a bus, she 
discovered that the only available seat was next to the man with whom she 
had just had the verbal altercation.
38
  Instead of resuming the same type of 
discourse, the woman began to ask the man about his life, and the man 
  
 31.  Id. at 10-12. 
 32.    FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 44. 
 35.  Id. at 44-48. 
 36.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 14-15.   
 37.  Id. at 14. 
 38.  Id. 
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responded in kind.
39
  While neither changed perspective, over the course of 
the dialogue each developed a deeper understanding of and appreciation for 
the other.
40
  In a case where traditional rhetoric had proved destructive, 
invitational rhetoric had succeeded in fostering the external conditions of 
safety, value, freedom,
41
 and openness.  Each speaker promoted safety by 
respecting a differing perspective on a highly charged issue, each speaker 
promoted value by legitimizing a different point of view, and each speaker 
promoted freedom by allowing the other speaker to continue to feel as she 
or he chose to feel with regard to this subject.  Also, each speaker promoted 
openness by looking at a different perspective. 
Another example of successful invitational rhetoric that Foss and 
Griffin have offered involved the manner in which poets Adrienne Rich, 
Alice Walker, and Audre Lorde handled acceptance of the 1974 National 
Book Award.
42
  Although all three women had received nominations for the 
award, only Rich received the actual award.
43
 However, when Rich 
accepted the award, she did so on behalf of herself, Walker, and Lorde, 
noting, “‘We, Audre Lorde, Adrienne Rich, and Alice Walker, together 
accept this award in the name of all the women whose voices have gone and 
still go unheard in a patriarchal world.’”
44
 In expressing their own 
perspective in this manner, the poets fostered the external conditions of 
safety, value, freedom,
45
 and openness. The poets promoted safety by 
recognizing as legitimate the one-winner approach of the judges of the 
National Book Awards, the poets promoted the value of the members of the 
extended audience by noting the personal sacrifices of many audience 
members, and the poets promoted freedom by allowing the audience to 
choose its own course of action in response to the speech.
46
  Also, the poets 
promoted openness by placing their perspective in a communication context 
of differing perspectives on the matter at hand. 
As these two examples suggest, invitational rhetoric can be beneficial 
for several reasons.  For instance, invitational rhetoric is particularly well-
suited for fostering “cooperative, nonadversarial, and ethical 
communication”  because invitational rhetoric accepts multiple perspectives 
as valid.
47
  Invitational rhetoric is especially helpful when one is engaged in 
  
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 14-15. 
 41.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 15. 
 42.  Id. at 13-14. 
 43.  Id. at 13. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 13-14. 
 47.  Id. at 15-16. 
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discourse with another person with whom one has an ongoing relationship,
48
 
although invitational rhetoric is not limited to this type of situation.  In 
contrast, when one goes to court and hopes never to see one’s opponent 
after the trial, then traditional rhetoric may be more appropriate.
49
  
Nonetheless, the bus example above indicates that invitational rhetoric can 
be helpful with strangers, too.
50
 
Additionally, invitational rhetoric validates the personal experiences of 
different individuals.
51
  Invitational rhetors do not have to be physicians, 
scientists, or attorneys to have valuable experiences to share with other 
invitational rhetors.  Common experience, whether from the lives of women 
or men or from the lives of privileged or less-privileged individuals, can 
have merit in invitational rhetoric.  Invitational rhetors can call upon such 
experiences to present their own personal truths about life.
52
  
Moreover, invitational rhetoric gives women and other outsiders, as 
well as individuals empathetic to the situations of such outsiders, a resource 
to employ in attempting “to transform systems of domination and 
oppression.”
53
  Foss and Foss have suggested that invitational rhetoric can 
help a rhetor to understand the positions of individuals, such as neo-Nazis, 
whose perspectives are hateful to many people.
54
 With a better 
understanding of such perspectives, the rhetor then can go about attempting 
to change the conditions that foster hateful perspectives.
55
  Accordingly, 
invitational rhetoric offers several important benefits to rhetors. 
B.  Applying Invitational Rhetoric to the Conflict over the Construction 
of the Law Professor Persona(e) 
Although invitational rhetoric might play out successfully in a number 
of conflicts common in the legal field, this Article focuses on the conflict 
regarding the rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e).  To 
sketch out how invitational rhetoric could unfold among lawyers involved 
in that conflict, this subsection of the Article will consider incentives for, 
contexts for, a process of, and possible content change of participation in 
invitational rhetoric.  The subsection also will address benefits of and 
potential concerns with using invitational rhetoric. 
  
 48.  Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 130-31. 
 49.  Id. at 130. 
 50.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 14-15. 
 51.  Id. at 5-6, 16.  
 52.  Karen A. Foss & Sonja K. Foss, Personal Experience as Evidence in Feminist Scholarship, 58 
W. J. COMM. 39, 39-40 (1994). 
 53.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 16. 
 54.   FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 18. 
 55.  Id. at 18-19. 
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First, for lawyers from the academy and lawyers from the world of 
practice to participate in invitational rhetoric and foster a better 
understanding of differing views on the persona(e) of the law professor, the 
lawyers would need some incentive.  This incentive exists in the major 
goals of legal education.  R. Randall Kelso and Charles D. Kelso offered 
four major goals of legal education that help explain how academic lawyers 
and practicing lawyers can find the incentive to communicate more 
effectively about legal education in general and the law professor persona(e) 
more specifically.
56
  According to Kelso and Kelso, four major goals of 
legal education are the following:  (1) advancing scholarship on the law, (2) 
graduating students who are able to perform the roles that practicing 
lawyers perform, (3) developing in law students the skills of legal problem-
solving, and (4) motivating law students to enter the ongoing discussion 
among members of the legal community about what the law is now and 
should become in the future.
57
 
These goals generally have appeal for both academics and practitioners.  
Although academic lawyers may be more interested in scholarship and 
practicing lawyers may be more interested in the roles that practicing 
lawyers perform, these particular goals are important to both groups.  For 
instance, academic lawyers like James Barr Ames have admitted that their 
scholarship should inform the practice of law,
58
 a prospect that has 
immediate significance for practicing lawyers who could benefit from pre-
existing thinking on important topics.  After all, practitioners cannot be 
experts in all areas of the law.
59
  From this perspective, scholarship needs to 
do something outside the academy.  If scholarship does not, the credibility 
of academics comes into question.  An important relationship exists, then, 
between scholarship and the roles that lawyers perform in practice. 
Furthermore, the skills of legal problem-solving apply to both law 
school discussions and the everyday world of legal practice.  At one level or 
another, both academics and practitioners deal with legal problems, and 
both groups would want future lawyers to know how to approach these legal 
problems.  Again, this point gets at the relevance of legal education, but the 
point also gets at a basic set of professional skills upon which practitioners 
rely.  Thus, legal problem-solving skills are of interest to lawyers of an 
academic nature as well as lawyers of a more practical nature.  
  
 56.  R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D. KELSO, STUDYING LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION 12-15 (1984). 
 57.  Id. 
 58. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, 48 AM. L. REG. 129, 142-43 
(1900). 
 59.  Id. at 143. 
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Additionally, discussion on what the law is and what it should become 
is another area of overlap.  Thoughtful and learned discussions on the 
role(s) of the law are well-suited to the writing of law review articles, an 
activity that would appeal to academic lawyers, but these discussions also 
can have a meaningful impact on the lives of practicing lawyers because 
those lawyers have to interact with the processes of the law on a daily 
basis.
60
  Hence, a working understanding of the present and future states of 
the law should have appeal to both lawyers inside and outside the academy.  
Given the general appeal of the noted goals of legal education to both 
academic lawyers and practicing lawyers, some room for common ground 
exists.  Discussion of this common ground, which essentially gets at the 
purposes of legal education, provides the incentive for lawyers from the two 
groups to employ invitational rhetoric regarding legal education.  As 
focused more particularly on the subject matter of the conflict regarding the 
law professor persona(e), this common ground would urge consideration of 
the appropriate persona(e) of the law professor in furthering the major goals 
of legal education.  With regard to the overlapping goals considered above, 
the law professor has, by way of his or her professional status, an important 
influence on legal scholarship, the skills of legal problem-solving, and the 
discussion of the role(s) of the law in society.  As noted above, legal 
scholarship can inform the roles that practicing lawyers perform.
61 
 
Accordingly, academic lawyers and practicing lawyers do have an incentive 
to try to communicate more productively about the role(s) of the law 
professor in legal education. 
Second, lawyers in favor of the scholar persona of the law professor and 
lawyers in favor of the practitioner persona of the law professor who find 
such an incentive to communicate invitationally would need to be able to 
communicate with each other in a context conducive to invitational rhetoric.  
Such a context would have physical and discursive dimensions.  In terms of 
the physical dimension, lawyers often meet during law school campus 
lectures, bar association functions, and the day-to-day work of public 
service functions of the bar.
62
  While law journals could be a forum for 
addressing the conflict that historically has played out in law journals, 
encouraging lawyers initially to communicate in person probably would be 
more effective since casually dismissing the views of someone who is 
physically present in the same context can be difficult. 
  
 60. Robert A. Leflar, The Law Teacher’s Place in the American Legal Profession, 8 J. SOC’Y PUB. 
TCHRS. L. 21, 27-28 (1964). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 22, 24.  
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In terms of the discursive dimension of the context, lawyers would need 
to foster the external conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness.
63
  
To foster safety, or “the creation of a feeling of security and [absence of] 
danger for the audience,”
64
 lawyers would need to feel free from the 
courtroom clash that often comes with traditional legal advocacy.  When 
one is in court to try or appeal a case, one functions in a situation in which 
one’s views on a given matter constantly come under critique.  As such, 
communicating invitationally right after the close of a heated trial or appeal 
would not be the best approach for fostering safety.   
To foster value, or “the acknowledgment that audience members have 
intrinsic or immanent worth,”
65
 lawyers again would need to avoid the clash 
of the courtroom or other often hostile environments like a negotiation 
situation between two divorcing spouses.  In environments largely free of 
this type of clash, such as bar association meetings, award functions, and 
other civically oriented functions, lawyers more likely would be more open 
to respect each other as people.  In this type of situation, value of other 
lawyers would be possible.  
Moreover, lawyers would want to foster freedom, or “the power to 
choose or decide.”
66
  For many lawyers, achieving this external condition 
should not be too difficult, at least in one sense.  Many lawyers would not 
have a difficult time making up their own minds on issues.  However, 
lawyers also would need to learn to respect the rights of others to make up 
their own minds.  Some trial lawyers might have a tendency to expect 
audiences to accept advocates’ advocacy.  Of course, audiences have their 
own minds.  Just as a jury can decide as it wishes, so can other lawyers.  
Recognizing this point might be a challenge for some lawyers, but sufficient 
quality communications with other parties as fellow humans, not as 
opponents, would help in this matter. 
In addition to fostering safety, value, and freedom through their 
discourse, lawyers would want to foster the external condition of openness, 
or the procedure of “seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives 
as possible.”
67
  Given that the legal field is one of advocacy, this external 
condition may be a challenge for lawyers to achieve.  Again, a trial or 
appellate lawyer received training in finding the “correct” answer to a legal 
problem and vigorously advocating that perspective on behalf of a client.  
Nonetheless, lawyers committed to treating each other respectfully could be 
  
 63.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10; FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39. 
 64.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
 65.  Id. at 11-12. 
 66.  Id. at 12. 
 67.  FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39. 
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willing to listen to each other to understand each other effectively.  
Acquiring multiple understandings of the ideal law professor persona(e) 
would be a function of having communicated with various other lawyers in 
an invitational manner.  Thus, while facing a challenge, lawyers willing to 
listen carefully could achieve openness.  In a situation in which lawyers 
could accomplish the external conditions of safety, value, freedom, and 
openness, the lawyers would stand a good chance of communicating in an 
invitational manner. 
Third, the process of invitational rhetoric would be an attempt to 
understand the views of individuals with different perspectives on the law 
professor persona(e).  Change of views would be a possibility that may 
come from the process, but, in the absence of change, participating lawyers 
still would have the opportunity to develop positive ongoing professional 
relationships that they may not have enjoyed to date.  At a minimum, 
willing lawyers would be able to understand more effectively the parties 
whom they have come to ignore or dismiss with uninformed argument.  
While the process of invitational rhetoric is not as precise as a multi-
step plan for terminating one’s smoking habit or another vice, the following 
is a suggestion of how the process might unfold between two individuals 
with different views of the role(s) of the law professor.  A communication 
consultant would lay out this general process for the participating lawyers.  
As the consultant would explain, the process most likely would begin in an 
informal manner at a gathering where academic lawyers and practicing 
lawyers would be present, such as one of the gatherings mentioned above.  
After the usual pleasantries, the two lawyers, located in a comfortable 
setting, would take turns explaining their views on the topic, and each 
lawyer would have the opportunity to enter the other lawyer’s world and see 
it as the other lawyer would see it.
68
  When speaking, one lawyer would 
refrain from judging the perspective of the other lawyer in the discussion, 
and the other lawyer would attempt to refrain from judging the perspective 
of the lawyer who was speaking.
69
  Instead of change, the focus of the 
communication would be understanding.
70
  
The communication consultant would explain that the first lawyer, 
taking the initiative, could outline the particulars of how she saw the role of 
the law professor in legal education.  Meanwhile, the second lawyer would 
make the effort to place his own views of the role of the law professor aside 
and also make an effort to understand the views of the first lawyer, which 
  
 68.  Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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might include the need for the law professor to be a scholar.  The second 
lawyer would have to listen carefully and may even want to take some brief 
notes.  If this were done politely, the second lawyer, almost becoming an 
active student of the views of the first lawyer, could ask the first lawyer to 
pause in her discussion and address a few points of clarification.  Mallin and 
Anderson have termed this type of active listening reflective listening.
71
  
The idea is that throughout the process the second lawyer would gain a 
developing understanding of the first lawyer’s explanations.  While some 
points of clarification could be helpful, the second lawyer, upon receiving 
clarifications, then would need to make sure the first lawyer was able to 
complete her explanation.  Most likely, this step in the process would take 
more than just a few minutes, especially since the second lawyer would 
want to allow the first lawyer to explain why she viewed the role of the law 
professor as she did.  At the end of this process, the second lawyer should 
be able to explain accurately and in some detail the first lawyer’s views to 
the first lawyer. 
The communication consultant would note that, after the first lawyer 
had a chance to explain her view of the law professor and the second lawyer 
had inquired about any points of clarification, the second lawyer then would 
have an opportunity to outline the particulars of how he saw the role of the 
law professor.  Meanwhile, the first lawyer would try to place her personal 
views of the role of the law professor aside and focus on understanding the 
views of the second lawyer, which might include a need for the law 
professor to be a practitioner.  The first lawyer would have to listen 
carefully and might desire to take some notes.  As before, except with roles 
reversed, the first lawyer, essentially becoming an active student of the 
views of the second lawyer, could ask the second lawyer to pause in his 
explanation and address a few matters of clarification.  The idea is that 
throughout the process the first lawyer would gain a developing 
understanding of the second lawyer’s explanations.  Although a few points 
of clarification could be helpful, the first lawyer, upon receiving 
clarifications, would need to make sure the second lawyer would be able to 
complete his explanation.  This step in the process probably would take 
time, especially since the first lawyer would want to allow the second 
lawyer to explain why he viewed the role of the law professor as he did.  At 
the end of this process, the first lawyer should be able to explain accurately 
and in some detail the second lawyer’s views to the second lawyer.   As the 
consultant would explain to the participating lawyers, during both stages of 
the process of invitational rhetoric, gaining more than a superficial 
  
 71.  Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 129.  
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understanding would be important because a deeper understanding can get 
at interests rather than just at general viewpoints.  Interests are concerns that 
motivate people, and understanding another party’s interests can help one 
connect more effectively with that party.
72
  Asking why a party sees 
something in a particular manner can be one productive way of 
understanding that party’s interests.
73
 
Looking for underlying interests would be helpful for the two 
hypothetical lawyers.  For example, the second lawyer might ask the first 
lawyer why the latter feels that the law professor should be a scholar, and 
the first lawyer might point out that the academy requires that law schools 
produce scholarship.  Also, the first lawyer might ask the second lawyer 
why the latter feels that the law professor should be a practitioner, and the 
second lawyer could indicate that future lawyers need to learn from lawyers 
who have performed the tasks that the future lawyers will perform.  In this 
case, two underlying interests are a requirement of functioning within the 
present academic system and a need for future lawyers to learn to practice 
law.  Although a deeper understanding might not result in the changing of 
minds,
74
 because of the knowledge of underlying interests and thus 
explanations associated with such knowledge, this type of understanding 
could allow parties to come to respect each other as professionals.  In other 
words, each party would know that the other party’s views were not random 
and devoid of explanation.  This result could be an improvement in the 
communication between academic lawyers and practicing lawyers. 
This hypothetical example of invitational rhetoric is just one possibility 
via which the process might unfold.  For instance, the consultant would note 
that a similar process also could take place in small groups, in which one 
lawyer would explain his or her views and also address points of 
clarification.  In this scenario, another lawyer then would assume that role.  
The process would repeat itself until all lawyers in the group had time to 
express their views.  In this manner, each participant would have a chance 
to speak and carefully listen for understanding.  This would not always be 
an easy task, but if lawyers, knowing that they all would have a chance to 
talk at some point, were willing to listen to each other, the door to 
understanding could begin to open. 
Fourth, possible content is another part of invitational rhetoric that 
should receive some attention.  As with any type of rhetoric, invitational 
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rhetoric does not always result in change of content,
75
 but, if conducted in a 
willing and respectful manner, the process can help relationships, 
professional and otherwise, develop.
76
  While the development of such 
relationships is often beneficial, in some cases invitational rhetoric can lead 
to some sort of change of content.
77
 
Such potential change may take place if lawyers, upon gaining a deeper 
understanding of other lawyers’ interests, come to see value in some of 
those interests in relation to their own interests.  For example, an academic 
lawyer might decide that more interaction with the world of practice could 
make his or her scholarship more accurate and relevant.  Also, a practicing 
lawyer might decide that some legal scholarship could inform the world of 
legal practice.  If enough lawyers in one group begin to see value in the 
interests of lawyers in the other group and vice versa, openness to some 
change or modification would become a possibility. 
A prescription of the content of invitational rhetoric among lawyers 
would be inconsistent with the assumptions of invitational rhetoric, which is 
not a top-down communication approach in which a consultant tells 
participants at what substantive result they should arrive.  Foss and Griffin 
have described invitational rhetoric, in part, as “an invitation to 
understanding,”
78
 not a requirement for adopting a message.  However, 
several examples, while not exhaustive, can illustrate the possibilities of 
invitational rhetoric as a means of fostering constructive communication 
among lawyers regarding the role(s) of the law professor. 
For instance, lawyers might decide to devise a law professor persona 
based on a hybrid persona.  One such approach might be akin to that of 
Albert M. Kales, who argued for a restricted amount of practical experience 
for the law professor.
79
  Assuming a distinction between taking care of 
clients and taking care of cases, such a persona would view client care as 
more business than law and something that would take a large amount of a 
lawyer’s time.
80
  This possible model could suggest that a law professor 
should handle cases, not clients, and to such cases the law professor would 
bring expertise in a given area.
81
  By being able to test legal hypotheses, as 
some might call them, through litigation, the law professor would have a 
better understanding of the legal world, and such an understanding of the 
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legal world would allow the law professor to become a better teacher.
82
  
Accordingly, this persona would balance scholarly and practical interests. 
Another possible hybrid approach might be akin to that of Harlan F. 
Stone, who insisted that the law professor embrace a persona of both scholar 
and practitioner.
83
  This model would note that, because logical and 
practical considerations are part of practicing law, the law professor should 
be familiar with both types of considerations.
84
  This persona could embrace 
Stone’s belief that “[t]he law teacher has indeed missed his calling who has 
nothing to offer his students but the solution of the purely intellectual 
problems of the law.”
85
  In short, this law professor persona could be that of 
“a well-rounded lawyer,”
86
 or one who has practiced law and now desires to 
teach law within a university setting. 
Besides the hybrid possibilities in which the law professor resides in an 
academic setting and either continues a limited practice of law or has 
practiced law extensively in the past, another possibility may emerge from 
invitational rhetoric regarding the law professor persona(e).  For instance, 
law schools could accept multiple personae simultaneously.  The scholar 
model may become one track to tenure in the law school, while the 
practitioner model discussed might become another track to tenure.  The 
former model would meet the university’s requirement that the law school 
produce scholarship for the university, and the latter model would meet the 
bar’s need for developing graduates prepared for the world of legal practice.  
For this model to work on an equitable basis, the lawyers who would 
develop such an approach may note that, in contrast to many cases in the 
present system of legal education, both professor models would have equal 
status within the law school.
87
  Neither scholarship nor skills training would 
assume higher status, as each would serve an important purpose.  
Invitational rhetoric offers several benefits to lawyers who have 
communicated about the ideal law professor persona(e).  These benefits 
relate to this long-standing conflict but also go beyond the conflict.  As 
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suggested above, successful invitational rhetoric would allow lawyers to 
come to understand each other more thoroughly on legal education topics 
like the ideal law professor persona(e).  With deeper understanding, which 
has been an important ingredient missing from the communication, at some 
point in the future lawyers could make more fully-informed decisions about 
how they want their field, including its educational component, to function.  
Along with greater understanding come greater possibilities for new 
approaches to old challenges. 
Not only would invitational rhetoric allow lawyers to come to greater 
understandings of their colleagues’ views on legal education, especially 
with regard to the ideal law professor persona(e), but invitational rhetoric 
also would offer lawyers the chance to nourish new relationships.
88
  As Foss 
and Griffin have emphasized, invitational rhetoric can be “a means to create 
a relationship.”
89 
Thus, if lawyers enter other lawyers’ worlds deeply 
enough, the lawyers may find something of value in those communicative 
interactions and seek to continue the communication.  Although ongoing 
relationships would not develop in every instance, in some instances 
lawyers might choose to further their communication through ongoing 
relationships.  When lawyers live and work in the same community, 
whether they work on a university campus or in court downtown, ongoing 
relationships can be of great value, particularly when lawyers need to work 
on larger projects like law reform issues or pro bono efforts.  Also, lawyers 
of differing stripes have the future of legal education at stake because 
academic lawyers work in that environment and the environment is 
supposed to prepare future lawyers for the world of legal practice.  Ideally, 
lawyers in a particular relationship would not only gain an understanding of 
other perspectives on the persona(e) at the front of the classroom in legal 
education, but the lawyers would deepen their interactions on other legal, or 
even nonlegal, subjects of importance.  The implications of invitational 
rhetoric could be widespread. 
Furthermore, because invitational rhetoric accepts multiple perspectives 
as valid, it is particularly well-suited for fostering “cooperative, 
nonadversarial, and ethical communication.”
90
  In the legal field, which 
often, although not always, gives pride of place to the more combative 
manifestations of traditional rhetoric, lawyers could improve by interacting 
with each other in a different manner on some occasions.  Indeed, lawyers 
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have to work with court and office personnel, each other, and sometimes 
other professionals like expert witnesses.  While successful lawyers have to 
function within an adversarial system, learning to communicate in other 
ways when possible would add an important humane dimension to legal 
practice, particularly when listening to the perspectives of others can be 
helpful to one’s work.  This point is especially salient when one is 
communicating with another person with whom one has an ongoing 
relationship, such as a court clerk or opposing counsel.
91
 
On a related note, since invitational rhetoric is a process of rhetoric as 
inquiry,
92
 any change in perspective that takes place occurs when members 
of the audience choose to make such change, but do so without the 
influence of a rhetor who presses for that change.
93
  For many lawyers, this 
type of communication will not be intuitive.  Given the entrenched nature of 
the processes of the U.S. legal system, traditional rhetoric has its place.  
However, not all types of communication require that communicators try to 
change each other.  Indeed, a break from the world of persuasion, a world 
that still calls for “right” and “wrong” answers to often complex problems, 
would be pleasant for many overworked attorneys.  Avoiding the pressure 
of many types of persuasion would be a healthy change.  Instead, when 
communicating within an invitational paradigm, lawyers would have the 
chance to make up their minds on matters like the ideal law professor 
persona(e) free of pressure.   
Accordingly, invitational rhetoric offers lawyers several important 
benefits. This genre of rhetoric offers opportunities for greater 
understanding of perspectives on legal education, including perspectives 
regarding the ideal law professor role(s).  Moreover, invitational rhetoric 
also offers chances for relationship building and more humane, relaxed 
discourse. 
Although invitational rhetoric offers several benefits to legal 
practitioners that would include and go beyond gaining a greater 
understanding of the various perspectives on the ideal law professor 
persona(e), one might raise a few concerns regarding the implementation of 
invitational rhetoric in the suggested manner.  Some consideration of such 
concerns is now appropriate, but the concerns are not obstacles to 
improving the ongoing conflict in the legal field about the law professor 
persona(e). 
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One potential concern is that, because invitational rhetoric relies upon 
the willingness of the lawyers involved,
94
 when the lawyers are unwilling to 
engage in invitational rhetoric, invitational rhetoric would not be helpful.  If 
both parties are unable to make attempts to understand each other, then 
invitational rhetoric will get them nowhere.  
This is a fair point.  When two parties do not desire to communicate 
productively with each other, invitational rhetoric, by definition, is 
impossible.
95
  Some lawyers, perhaps those deeply entrenched within an 
adversarial system, will not want to participate in invitational rhetoric.  
However, different lawyers see the world differently, and other lawyers may 
choose to participate in invitational rhetoric.  The key point here is that 
lawyers come in many variations. Some lawyers may find invitational 
rhetoric unappealing, but others may see this genre of rhetoric as a welcome 
change from the normal discourse of the field.   
Additionally, since many lawyers are skillful at speaking, one might ask 
whether lawyers really can listen well.  After all, good listening is a key part 
of invitational rhetoric.
96
 Despite much of the confrontational 
communication in the legal field, some lawyers most likely are effective at 
listening, even if they often listen in potentially confrontational situations.  
For instance, lawyers have to listen to clients who enter law offices in need 
of assistance. A client with extensive assets who wants a will needs a 
lawyer who can carefully listen to that client’s needs.  Likewise, a client 
who needs help defending against a negligence suit that stems from a car 
crash wants a lawyer who can listen carefully to the client’s perspective of 
what happened, as well as to the perspectives of witnesses to the crash.  To 
be effective, each lawyer needs information from other individuals.  Also, 
besides issuing decisions, appellate judges spend time listening to lawyers 
who argue appeals.  These judges do ask questions, but the other side of the 
coin is that the judges also need to listen to the lawyers to gain information.  
Indeed, lawyers call upon listening skills in a variety of professional 
contexts. 
As noted above, such listening skills often take place in a potentially 
adversarial context.  However, lawyers could transfer such skills to a 
nonadversarial context like one open to invitational rhetoric and develop the 
skills in that context.  While lawyers would have no need to find fault with 
the communication to which they would listen, the need to understand 
would remain.  Lawyers could place additional emphasis on further 
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understanding.  As such, lawyers could build upon some of their pre-
existing skills, even those for which they are often less well known, to 
communicate in an invitational manner.  
Finally, since parties to invitational rhetoric are not advocating the 
merits of their views, invitational rhetoric is not the most effective type of 
rhetoric for decision-making.  This is an accurate point.  In some cases, 
invitational rhetoric can lead to change because one party may be willing to 
adopt a view of another party.
97
  However, because invitational rhetoric 
does not focus on advocacy, the next section of this Article will offer a 
discussion of cooperative rhetoric, which embraces both understanding and 
advocacy.  Nonetheless, since invitational rhetoric can foster the 
understanding necessary for improved communication and in turn 
successful cooperative rhetoric, the general lack of appropriateness of 
invitational rhetoric for explicit decision-making does not negate the value 
of invitational rhetoric. 
In some cases, invitational rhetoric alone can lead to change, but 
invitational rhetoric is most likely not the final step in addressing the 
ongoing conflict among lawyers regarding the construction of the law 
professor persona(e).  Because cooperative rhetoric is a more effective type 
of rhetoric for decision-making, cooperative rhetoric now calls for attention. 
III.  COOPERATIVE RHETORIC 
A. Cooperative Rhetoric Defined 
If no decision comes from the process of invitational rhetoric, at some 
point in time the legal field still would benefit from deciding what kind of 
law professor persona(e) the field should retain or adopt.  Because of the 
limits of traditional rhetoric in terms of fostering understanding and 
invitational rhetoric in terms of fostering more structured decision-making, 
another genre of rhetoric would be of great value to legal decision-makers.  
Cooperative rhetoric combines the best of both traditional and invitational 
rhetorics.  In short, this approach allows rhetors to come to understand the 
perspectives of each other and also gives the various rhetors the chance to 
argue the merits of such perspectives to arrive at a decision.  In light of the 
opportunity that cooperative rhetoric presents, this section of the Article 
explains how cooperative rhetoric can be of value to lawyers who have 
participated in the ongoing conflict over the rhetorical construction of the 
law professor persona(e). 
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Scholars have used a variety of terms to speak of the concept of 
cooperative rhetoric.  For instance, Josina M. Makau and Debian L. Marty 
have employed cooperative argumentation,
98
 Irwin Mallin and Karrin 
Vasby Anderson have used constructive argument,
99
 and Steven E. Daniels 





  Despite contemporary interest in this genre of 
rhetoric, Richard Fulkerson showed that the concept is not entirely new 
because in the Topics Aristotle referenced the idea of common purpose in 
rhetoric.
102
  For the sake of consistency, this Article will call upon the term 
cooperative rhetoric.   
Under the paradigm of cooperative rhetoric, rhetors focus on addressing 
the problem at hand as opposed to “winning” the argument.
103
  Cooperative 
rhetoric is “a process of reasoned interaction intended to help participants 
and audiences make the best assessments or the best decisions in any given 
situation.”
104
  In terms of an analogy, one might envision “a group of 
mountain climbers concerned for their mutual safety” and thus interested in 
testing “two [or more] ropes in every conceivable way and then select[ing] 
for their common use the stronger [or strongest] one.”
105
  Because parties to 
the rhetoric are collaborators, not opponents, in addressing problems,
106
 the 
parties see themselves as mutual resources.
107
  Through the process of 
cooperative rhetoric, a cooperative rhetor “offers her [or his] ideas rather 
than imposing them, and builds upon her [or his] interlocutor’s ideas rather 
than tearing them down.”
108
  Naturally, listening is a key part of this 
process, too.
109
 Accordingly, cooperative rhetoric seeks to offer 
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Furthermore, cooperative rhetoric places emphasis on the 
interdependence of people and ideas.
111
  The cooperative potential of any 
given group of rhetors is a function of “the significant value that parties 
place on their relationships with one another, their willingness to trust and 
share power, their desire for open and constructive communication, and 
their respect for creative approaches to” addressing problems.
112
  This type 
of rhetoric can take place in various communication contexts, including 
group situations and interpersonal situations.
113
 
As this description has illustrated, cooperative rhetoric is a combination 
of the best manifestations of invitational and traditional rhetorics.  Because 
cooperative rhetoric allows both or all parties to explain themselves to their 
fellow rhetors, it places emphasis on the dialogic focus of invitational 
rhetoric.
114
  Additionally, since cooperative rhetoric then allows parties 
respectfully to advocate their positions to determine the most appropriate 
option or options for that situation, cooperative rhetoric places emphasis on 
the deliberative focus of traditional rhetoric.
115
  However, contrary to many 
situations in which traditional rhetoric occurs, situations in which 
cooperative rhetoric succeeds involve a respectful tone and a willingness of 
the rhetors to yield to positions more conducive to addressing the problems 
at hand.  Convictions matter, but so do relationships.
116
  In comparing 
rhetors to lovers, Wayne Brockriede might add that cooperative rhetors 
value their co-rhetors enough to sacrifice some personal rhetorical gain for 
the good of “a bilateral relationship.”
117
 
This understanding of cooperative rhetoric envisions a dialectic between 
dialogue and deliberation.  In some cases, dialogue will encourage the 
communication more toward learning, and in other situations deliberation 
will encourage the communication more toward decision-making.
118
  As 
with most any dialectic, including the dialectic between the constructive 
abilities of rhetoric and gender, some contradiction or tension exists 
between the two foci here, yet for cooperative rhetoric to work as a whole 
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Nonetheless, on a critical note, one might query what would happen 
when some parties to a rhetorical situation fail to cooperate.  One option is 
for a motivated party to set the example for other parties.  By way of an 
analogy, even if oncoming night drivers refuse to dim their headlights, a 
frustrated driver might dim the lights on his or her own vehicle to try to 
prevent a major crash.
120
  One can sacrifice one’s personal need for 
vindication and achieve a greater good.
121
  This is the spirit of cooperative 
rhetoric.  In addressing how cooperative decision-making could function in 
a competitive culture, Lani Guinier, a law professor, stated, “‘I think the 
best explanation is to model it.’”
122
   
Even if parties are willing to participate in cooperative rhetoric, at some 
point they still may reach an impasse.  When the parties arrive at such an 
impasse, they may want to ask what sort of evidence might change 
someone’s view; this inquiry could involve researching new evidence.
123
  
Sometimes thinking out loud can be another option for dealing with blocks 
in the communicative process.
124
  Because cooperative rhetoric can be an 
ongoing process that evolves over time,
125
 the impasse-bound parties may 
want to return to work on their problem with fresh minds at a later date.  
Such is an understanding of cooperative rhetoric. 
Despite the importance of dialogue to the cooperative process, the 
foregoing synthesized literature has not embraced invitational rhetoric 
vigorously.  Of the major pieces of research on cooperative rhetoric 
addressed in this subsection, only the Mallin and Anderson article explicitly 
made an attempt to develop cooperative rhetoric in part based on 
invitational rhetoric.
126
  While Mallin and Anderson noted that invitational 
rhetoric has value for understanding cooperative rhetoric,
127
 they included in 
their study various theories that inform cooperative rhetoric and did not 
focus specifically on invitational rhetoric. In light of the theoretical 
discussion of invitational rhetoric above and the potential insights for 
cooperative rhetoric that such a discussion can provide, invitational rhetoric 
deserves some additional consideration as a theory that can foster a more 
developed understanding of the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric.  
The external conditions that invitational rhetoric considers can help 
illustrate the environment in which cooperative rhetors are supposed to be 
  
 120.   MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 90. 
 121.   Id. 
 122.   Id. at 105.  
 123. Walker & Daniels, supra note 101, at 143. 
 124. Id. 
 125.   DANIELS & WALKER, supra note 100, at 63. 
 126. Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 121. 
 127.   Id.  
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able to explain themselves and listen to others, eventually to make informed 
decisions.  Mallin and Anderson noted this point in passing,
128
 but this 
insight calls for more than brief attention.  In their theory of invitational 
rhetoric, Foss and Griffin have maintained that safety, value, and freedom 
are three important external conditions.
129
  Foss and Griffin have defined 
these conditions in this way:  safety as “the creation of a feeling of security 
and [absence of] danger for the audience,” value as “the acknowledgment 
that audience members have intrinsic or immanent worth,” and freedom as 
“the power to choose or decide.”
130
  To the work of Foss and Griffin, Foss 
and colleague Karen A. Foss have added openness as a fourth condition that 
helps foster the type of climate desired for invitational rhetoric or 
cooperative rhetoric.
131
  Foss and Foss have defined openness as the process 
of “seek[ing] out and consider[ing] as many perspectives as possible.”
132
 
The external condition of openness, which Mallin and Anderson did not 
address in light of invitational rhetoric,
133
 is especially important to 
cooperative rhetoric.  While a party to cooperative rhetoric needs to feel 
safe in the communication situation, of some value to the process, and free 
to choose for himself or herself, the party also has to remain open to new 
ideas.  If a party is closed to new ideas, the result can become traditional 
rhetoric, in which the rhetors, unyielding to each other, try to persuade the 
audience of the “correctness” of the rhetors’ views.  In this scenario, only 
the audience remains open to change; the rhetors do not.  This process, by 
itself, can be quite uninformed for the parties, and thus counterproductive.  
No openness means no cooperative rhetoric.  However, with openness, the 
parties develop the spirit of cooperative rhetoric, which is oriented toward 
informed decision-making, not just decision-making in general.
134
  
Openness, then, is an important external condition needed in creating a 
climate for cooperative rhetoric.  
Overall, an understanding of the conditions of safety, value, freedom, 
and openness, which, as Foss and Griffin explained with the interpersonal 
and public address examples above, can produce the type of communication 
climate that encourages dialogue.
135
 When individuals feel unsafe, 
devalued, and constrained regarding decision-making and are close-minded, 
they are unlikely to enter the process of dialogue.  Without that dialogue, 
  
 128. Id. at 124. 
 129. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 10. 
 130.   Id. at 10-12.  
 131. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 39. 
 132.   Id. 
 133.   Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 124. 
 134. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87. 
 135. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 35-39; Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 13-15. 
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cooperative rhetoric fails.
136
  Thus, an understanding of these conditions, 
especially the condition of openness, can help establish a climate in which 
the understanding needed in cooperative rhetoric is likely to take place. 
To foster these conditions of safety, value, freedom, and openness that 
can lead to invitational rhetoric, Foss and Foss have suggested the process 
of re-sourcement, which refers to finding a new source of “energy and 
inspiration” for one’s communication.
137
 Re-sourcement involves 
disengaging oneself from an interaction frame of conquest or conversion of 
one’s audience and then engaging that audience from a nonconquest and 
nonconversion interaction frame.
138
  In other words, participants in the 
communication move away from trying to prove others “wrong” and focus 
on opening themselves up to comprehending others’ views.  In cooperative 
rhetoric, when one is temporarily focused on another party’s understanding 
of a matter, one is necessarily less focused on advancing one’s own 
understanding and can learn from one’s fellow cooperative rhetor.  This 
type of understanding can suggest new insight that leads one to change and, 
ideally, improve one’s own understanding of the problem at hand.  With 
more information, decision-making should improve.
139
  As such, the notion 
of re-sourcement from invitational rhetoric enriches an understanding of 
cooperative rhetoric.  
In addition to offering both the specific external conditions that can 
establish a climate for cooperative rhetoric and the concept of re-
sourcement that helps bring about the needed external conditions, 
invitational rhetoric also validates the personal experiences of different 
individuals,
140
 not just of traditional experts such as physicians, scientists, or 
attorneys.  This approach can lead to new insights from unexpected sources.  
Foss and Foss have pointed out that one’s personal experience often 
functions as one’s personal truth,
141
 and such experience comes from 
individuals of varying types.  When foregrounded in a discussion, personal 
experience from individuals gives voice to a variety of perspectives and, in 
a cooperative rhetoric situation, can enrich decision-making.  The more 
relevant information the decision-makers have, the more informed the 
decisions should be.
142
   
  
 136. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87. 
 137. FOSS & FOSS, supra note 29, at 44. 
 138.   Id. at 44-48. 
 139. MAKAU & MARTY, supra note 21, at 87. 
 140. Foss & Griffin, supra note 8, at 5-6, 16. 
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While not necessarily of prominent value to the conflict over the law 
professor persona(e), in which the immediate parties are all lawyers, and 
thus traditional experts, giving voice to nontraditional experts in other law-
related conflicts can provide for a more informed decision-making process.  
For instance, in a legal conflict over logging in a particular forest, hearing 
from experts well-versed in the law and environmental science is not 
enough because nontraditional experts may live near the area in question.  
These nontraditional experts have much to say about environmental policies 
that directly will impact the lifestyles of those who live in the area.  Not 
only is this process one of validating communication for the nontraditional 
experts in the situation, but the communication can provide more 
information regarding parties’ experiences upon which decision-makers can 
make informed decisions.  This is another aspect of invitational rhetoric that 
can help develop a theory of cooperative rhetoric.  
The last few pages of this subsection have identified some aspects of 
invitational rhetoric that can provide for a richer understanding of the 
dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric.  A better understanding of the 
external factors that give rise to invitational rhetoric provides a deeper 
understanding of the how those factors can foster dialogue within a 
cooperative rhetoric context.  Re-sourcement adds to an understanding of 
refocusing on other parties to the communication, necessary for cooperative 
rhetoric to flourish.  Also, the importance of voices of many backgrounds, 
valued in invitational rhetoric, demonstrates that, as relevant, many voices 
should speak in a cooperative rhetoric situation so that the decision-makers 
can make more knowledgeable decisions.  Viewed through an invitational 
lens, the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric becomes clearer.   
B.  Collaborative Law as Precedent for Employing Cooperative 
Rhetoric 
Because the legal field in the United States, as well as in other common 
law jurisdictions, places great value upon precedent, having a precedent for 
the implementation of cooperative rhetoric in a law-related conflict like the 
conflict over the construction of the law professor persona(e) is helpful.  
The notion of collaborative law, upon which this subsection of the Article 
elaborates, provides such a precedent to suggest that cooperative rhetoric 
can function well within some law-related conflicts. 
Collaborative law, a type of alternative dispute resolution,
143
 is a 




 143. Harry L. Tindall & Jennie R. Smith, The Uniform Collaborative Law Act As a Teaching Tool, 
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685, 690 (2009). 
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and this approach focuses on “offering ‘kinder and gentler’ ways of helping 
parties resolve their differences.”
145 
 Most often used in family law cases 
such as divorce cases,
146
 the process of collaborative law encourages parties 
to opt for nonlitigation alternatives to resolve their disputes.
147
  In agreeing 
not to litigate, parties sit down with each other and their lawyers to work out 
the best solution given the circumstances,
148
 and the parties aim to do so 
without court intervention.
149
  The idea is to work together toward a 
settlement of the relevant issues
150
 and give the parties more control over, 
and thus more satisfaction regarding, the outcome of the process.
151
  Parties 
who have contributed more to the process are more likely to comply with 
the final product.
152
  The process of collaborative law is confidential
153
 and 
involves “full and timely disclosure of all relevant information.”
154 
 The 
lawyers often act more as counselors than as advocates.
155
  If litigation 
results, the lawyers, by way of a pre-existing agreement with the clients 
typically called a collaborative law participation agreement, have to 
withdraw from the situation, so the litigation incentive for lawyers is 
absent.
156 
 Likewise, each attorney promises to withdraw from the case if the 
attorney learns his or her client has undermined the collaborative process.
157
 
In a brief hypothetical example, two collaborative lawyers and their 
clients would sit down for a four-way meeting
158
 that would address 
possible approaches to managing a divorce.  In advance, the wife and the 
husband would have expressed their desires to their respective lawyers.  
Also in advance, the lawyers would have reviewed the available documents, 
  
 144. William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering:  A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 
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 146. Schwab, supra note 144, at 354. 
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tive Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2004). 
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PUB. POL’Y 113, 131 (2009). 
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BOSTON B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 12. 
 155. Boyarin, supra note 149, at 506. 
 156. Id. at 495; Schwab, supra note 144, at 358. 
 157.    Reynolds & Tennant, supra note 154, at 12. 
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such as deeds, mortgages, car payments, and records of credit card debt, to 
determine if their clients’ desires had factual support.  If possible, the 
attorneys would have tried to establish a collaborative relationship before 
the first four-way meeting.
159  
To the first four-way meeting, which would 
help lay an important foundation for the overall process,
160
 the parties would 
bring the supporting documents.  At the meetings, the parties would aim to 
follow previously agreed upon agendas.
161
  While each lawyer would know 
his or her client’s interests in advance, at the first meeting the lawyers and 
the parties would need to clarify each party’s interests.  This process calls 
for the type of active listening, reflective listening, described in the 
discussion of invitational rhetoric above.
162
  The parties would need to be 
open with each other about their interests.
163
  Specifically, the wife might 
want to keep a sports car; the husband might want to make sure he has 
custody of the children.  Different options for addressing these issues would 
receive attention.  
In addition to dialogue, some well-mannered advocacy of options would 
be necessary to the process.  One lawyer could argue that, given her daily 
commute, the wife would need an automobile, while the other lawyer might 
argue that, based on prior parenting experiences, the father should have 
custody of the children.  If some type of resolution is possible for certain 
issues, those issues would be off the table.  If not, those issues may require 
additional consideration after the parties and lawyers have had a chance to 
take a break and think more carefully about each party’s interests.  In this 
case, subsequent meetings would be helpful.  Either way, the parties and the 
lawyers would have to be willing to adjust their contentions throughout the 
process.  For example, adjustments could include accepting a different 
family car that would meet the needs of a commute and having partial 
custody of children. 
Again, in the process of working toward a resolution of some sort, the 
dialectic of understanding and advocacy would play out.  Since the process 
is problem-solving oriented, rather than adversarial in nature, the parties, 
who have opted for collaborative law instead of the expensive and 
combative traditional option of litigation, would focus on how they could 
both find a reasonable end to their marriage. This process would not be for 
individuals who seek the most personally lucrative or vengeful end to a 
marriage. 
  
 159.    Id. at 990. 
 160.    Id. at 991. 
 161.    Id. at 993. 
 162.   Mallin & Anderson, supra note 9, at 129. 
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The practice of collaborative law has received formal recognition, 
including in the curricula at some law schools.
164 
 Various law schools now 
cover collaborative law in seminars on dispute resolution systems, 
professional ethics classes, and advanced classes on domestic relations 
law.
165
 Santa Clara University has offered a class specifically in 
collaborative law,
166
 and Loyola University of New Orleans developed a 
year-long interdisciplinary course on collaborative practice that aimed to 
bring together graduate students in fields like law, psychology, social work, 
and business.
167
  Courses like the one at Loyola University have both 
theoretical and practical dimensions because students study why 
collaborative practice can be effective and then apply that understanding to 




Beyond the law school context, many legal communities and some 
states have recognized collaborative law in one manner or another.  
Attorneys practice collaborative law across the United States, as well as in 
Canada, Europe, and Australia.
169
 In the United States, training for 
collaborative practice often takes place locally and thus is readily 
available.
170
  On a more formal level, Texas was the first state to adopt a 
collaborative law statute.
171
  North Carolina and California soon followed 
the Texas example with their own collaborative law statutes.
172
 More 
recently, states such as Utah, Nevada, Texas, and Hawaii, as well as the 
District of Columbia, adopted the Uniform Collaborative Law Act (UCLA), 
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As an interdisciplinary process, collaborative law involves various 
fields like psychology, social work, and business,
174 
but collaborative law 
also involves the field of communication.  The description of collaborative 
law in the preceding pages suggests that collaborative law as an alternative 
legal process relates closely to cooperative rhetoric.  Indeed, collaborative 
law is an example of how cooperative rhetoric can play out in a given field, 
here the legal field.  In general, cooperative rhetoric explains how both 
understanding and advocacy are key ingredients in collaborative law.  In the 
manner noted above, participants in collaborative law work to develop 
understanding of the interests of fellow participants and also employ 
advocacy to test ideas and move toward resolutions. 
More specifically, in terms of the dialogic dimension of collaborative 
law, cooperative rhetoric, as invitational rhetoric informs it, has much to 
offer.  Indeed, cooperative rhetoric addresses the external conditions of 
safety, value, freedom, and openness necessary for collaborative law to 
occur successfully.  For instance, parties to collaborative law need to feel 
safe enough that they are willing to disclose documents and other 
information that normally would remain closely held before, and sometimes 
even during, the cat-and-mouse process of civil discovery.  Conflicts 
notwithstanding, the parties also have to be able to see some human value in 
each other because, without recognizing that each party has importance, the 
parties can allow their frustrations and grudges to take over.  Under these 
conditions, collaborative law would revert back to a more hostile and clash-
oriented process that would not be collaborative in nature. 
Another external condition, freedom, also explains the climate 
necessary for collaborative law.  When parties to collaborative law try to 
force resolutions on each other, the process becomes more akin to some 
types of traditional civil litigation, in which parties, through their attorneys, 
try to force each other into a corner.  For example, in civil litigation an 
attorney might claim that her opponent’s case would be without value at 
trial and that the opponent should counsel his client to take a minor 
settlement at once or risk getting nothing.  Instead of cornering each other, 
parties in a collaborative process should recognize that both parties have the 
freedom to make personal choices, given the constraints of the situation. A 
collaborative process involves at least two parties empowered to make 
decisions. 
  
title=Collaborative%20Law%20Act (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).  See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-19-101 – 
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The final external condition relevant to a productive climate for 
collaborative law is openness.  When parties are open to new suggestions, 
the process can move forward. If a party rigidly insists that, due to 
transportation needs, the party must get a specific vehicle after a divorce, 
the process may go nowhere. However, if the first party is open to receiving 
a cash payment from the second party that will address the transportation 
needs, the process can move forward in a productive manner. 
Just as the external conditions needed for cooperative rhetoric help 
explain the conditions needed for collaborative law, so does the concept of 
re-sourcement.  Parties who wish to avoid the hostile confrontation common 
in traditional divorce or child custody proceedings need to be able to move 
their goals away from conquest and focus initially on understanding.  
Conquest does not address the potentially unknown needs of other parties, 
nor does it give one a chance to explain one’s own needs.  When parties 
find a new source of focus for the communication process they can move 
away from traditional litigation models and toward less destructive models. 
Additionally, the importance of giving voice to nontraditional experts 
that is a part of the dialogic dimension of cooperative rhetoric is instructive 
in explaining collaborative law.  In a traditional child custody case, the 
voices of the children easily might receive inadequate attention because the 
lawyers are zealously representing the parties and the parents are full of hate 
for each other.  However, in a collaborative law situation, in which the 
parties have agreed to try to work out a nonlitigation resolution to the 
situation, the parties will arrive at a more informed decision if they give 
voice to all individuals with a stake in the outcome.  Such individuals would 
include children.
175
 Just as the parents need a say, so do the other 
individuals whose futures are at stake in the decision-making process of 
collaborative law.  Despite these insights that cooperative rhetoric offers the 
communication aspect, particularly the dialogic dimension of the 
communication aspect, of collaborative law, lawyers have much to learn 
about how communication theory can inform collaborative law.  A 
LexisNexis search of fifty-eight law review articles and other articles with 
the term collaborative law in the titles revealed that, while forty-five articles 
at least contained the term communication, only one article contained the 
term communication theory, which was in a footnote that appropriately 
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pointed to the lack of communication theory in legal education.
176
  No 
articles contained the term rhetorical theory or the term cooperative 
rhetoric.  Because fields other than psychology, business, and social work 
can contribute to a richer understanding of the process of collaborative law, 
lawyers would benefit from considering what communication theories like 
cooperative rhetoric have to say about collaborative law. 
C. Applying Cooperative Rhetoric to the Conflict over the Construction 
of the Law Professor Persona(e) 
In light of collaborative law as a precedent for the implementation of 
cooperative rhetoric in certain law-related conflicts, lawyers involved in the 
ongoing conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor 
persona(e) ultimately would stand to gain from employing cooperative 
rhetoric.  To date, lawyers have filled volumes deliberating over law 
professor personae, but, because of the existing problem with 
understanding, lawyers initially would benefit from gaining a more 
complete comprehension of differing perspectives on law professor 
personae by focusing on dialogue for a period of time.  In short, at this point 
traditional rhetoric has had its time, and invitational rhetoric still awaits its 
time.  Given its focus on understanding, invitational rhetoric is a medicinal 
genre of rhetoric appropriate for the immediate future.  However, at some 
point in the future, when willing lawyers have listened for understanding 
through invitational rhetoric and if invitational rhetoric alone has not 
provided for sufficient decision-making, a need for some deliberation and 
decision-making still would remain.  At that future moment, cooperative 
rhetoric, which collaborative law precedents, would come into play. 
As the preceding discussion of invitational rhetoric suggested, an 
important incentive for parties to participate in this cooperative process is 
common ground regarding the goals for legal education.  Indeed, some of 
the major goals of legal education, including producing legal scholarship, 
addressing the roles of practicing lawyers, developing the skills of legal 
problem-solving, and discussing what law is and should be,
177
 speak to the 
needs of both academic lawyers and practicing lawyers.  By way of his or 
her professional status, the law professor has an important influence on the 
furtherance of these goals.  Accordingly, academic lawyers and practicing 
lawyers have an incentive to try to communicate more productively about 
the role(s) of the law professor in legal education. 
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Given this incentive for lawyers to participate in a cooperative process, 
a communication consultant would explain an overview of that process to 
the participating lawyers in this manner.  As noted above, lawyers often 
meet during law school campus lectures, bar association functions, and the 
day-to-day work of public service functions of the bar.
178 
 With the general 
presence of safety, value, freedom, and openness, these situations offer the 
chance for invitational rhetoric to take place.  Because of the constructive 
nature of these situations, the situations also offer the chance for 
cooperative rhetoric to transpire.  In such a cooperative situation, lawyers 
would be able to focus on dialogue as well as respectful advocacy.  This 
type of advocacy, informed through dialogue, could spill over from these 
situations into written fora like law journals and legal magazines, which 
then would spread the argumentation to a nationwide legal audience.  A 
special symposium, later published in a law journal, would be another 
option. 
The communication consultant would note that, through this procedure, 
willing lawyers would focus on effective approaches to the persona(e) most 
appropriate for current legal education, rather than on personal egos and 
reputations.  Given the long-standing Aristotelian assumptions of the legal 
system in the United States, spirited argumentation most likely would result 
at some point, but lawyers would do well to view their colleagues as 
resources rather than opponents.
179
 Rather than promoting hostile advocacy, 
the goal would be promoting an effective approach or effective approaches 
to legal education, specifically with regard to the law professor role(s).  
Lawyers and their ideas would interact, but in a constructive manner.  
More specifically, the process between the two hypothetical lawyers 
noted above could look something like this.  The communication consultant 
would explain that, one at a time, the lawyers would outline the particulars 
of how they saw the role(s) of the law professor in legal education.  While 
one lawyer spoke, the other lawyer would try to put aside his or her views 
and instead focus on understanding the other lawyer, which might include 
asking some questions, and then the roles would reverse.  The active 
listening needed for this process is the reflective listening that Mallin and 
Anderson described.
180 
 This part of the process would be akin to the part of 
a collaborative law process in which parties to a child custody matter offer 
their understandings, needs, and suggested approaches to addressing the 
situation, except in the former situation the lawyers would not have their 
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own counsel as the parties in the child custody matter would.  Much like the 
parties to a collaborative law process, the parties to cooperative rhetoric 
would assume an approach that seeks to avoid the type of destructive 
rhetoric often found in litigation.  Re-sourcement would be helpful here, 
too.  At the end of this dialogic part in the process, the lawyers ideally 
should be able to explain accurately and in some detail the views they have 
come to understand via this portion of the process. 
Subsequently, either on the same occasion or on another one, the 
lawyers would proceed to argue over the merits of the perspectives on the 
table.  As the consultant would note, this process would involve attempts to 
further the merits of the models placed on the table, but, in contrast to the 
process of argumentation that has been underway in the ongoing 
communication regarding the law professor persona(e), the cooperative 
process would involve two parties who have agreed to remain open to 
change in order to make an effective decision.  For instance, the first lawyer 
might realize that the second lawyer has made a good point about the need 
for law schools to graduate practice-ready students, and the first lawyer may 
want to modify, but not abandon, her own model.  Likewise, the second 
lawyer might realize that, given that the current law school exists within the 
university system, the first lawyer has made a strong point that scholarship 
is important to the law professor persona and accordingly modify, but not 
abandon, his model.  This part of the process would be akin to the part of a 
collaborative law process in which the lawyers and parties evaluate 
differing possible approaches to the situation.  Just as in collaborative law, 
the parties in the conflict over the law professor persona(e) would need to 
keep in mind the commitment to work on the problem and avoid threatening 
to take a more verbally hostile approach to the situation.  In the case studied 
here, the cooperative lawyers could go back and forth working out which 
points had some merit and which were baseless. 
Although one party could completely abandon a model in favor of 
another model, in light of the longstanding and entrenched views in the 
conflict over the law professor persona(e), this would be unlikely.  
However, as the two lawyers make strong points about the relative merits of 
their preferred models, the parties, now more informed about the models on 
the table, might be willing to accept some changes based on the reasoning 
process.  Much the same as in a collaborative law situation, but with 
different content, such a reasoning process that involves some give and take 
could help foster a workable model of the law professor that speaks to the 
various needs, practical and scholarly, of the two major groups in this 
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conflict.  Eventually, at some point in the future and as a function of having 
participated in cooperative rhetoric, lawyers would retain, alter, or even 
abandon the current law professor persona, that of the scholar.
181 
 Quite 
predictably, not all lawyers would be willing to participate in cooperative 
rhetoric, but some probably would be.  Some of the lawyers who practice 
collaborative law, who now can be found across the United States,
182 
would 
be good ambassadors for cooperative rhetoric as a means of improving 
communication regarding the ongoing conflict over the law professor 
persona(e), as well communication regarding other important issues in the 
legal world.  Such lawyers could set the example and perhaps encourage 
more skeptical lawyers to try cooperative rhetoric on this issue or others of 
importance.   
In picking up on differing concerns, lawyers might decide cooperatively 
to devise any of several possible law professor persona(e).  For instance, 
lawyers might opt for a model in which the law professor would continue to 
practice while teaching and thus be able to test legal hypotheses,
183
 or 
lawyers could opt for a model in which a lawyer with great practical 
experience would become a full-time professor.
184 
 Alternatively, lawyers 
could find that the two different major law professor personae, the scholar 
and the practitioner, together meet the expectations of the university and the 
bar.  Since one persona would be appropriate for producing scholarship and 
the other persona would be appropriate for developing hands-on skills in 
law students, the personae together would be available to meet the different 
demands placed on law schools.   
Various decisions regarding the law professor persona(e) could result 
from this cooperative approach to rhetoric.  Because a cooperative approach 
does not prescribe substantive decisions but rather suggests a process for 
communication and leaves content up to the parties to the communication, 
these potential results are merely illustrations of what content that might 
develop, not necessarily what has to develop.  The purpose of the 
illustrations is to make the cooperative process more concrete at this point.  
Again, these are only some conceivable results that could stem from 
cooperative rhetoric, but they begin to illustrate how this type of process 
might generate results. 
Supported by collaborative lawyers and other open-minded lawyers, 
cooperative rhetoric would come with several benefits.  For instance, some 
  
 181. For recognition that the current law professor persona is that of the scholar, see Pedrioli, supra 
note 1, at 725. 
 182. Hoffman, supra note 169. 
 183.    Kales, supra note 79, at 259-60. 
 184.    Stone, supra note 83, at 210-11. 
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lawyers would develop a greater appreciation for listening and 
understanding, which can be helpful in dealing with people in many 
contexts.  At the same time, lawyers would be able to call upon their 
existing skills of persuasion, ideally in a way that focuses more on the 
messages than on the messengers.  Additionally, as a function of the 
communication, a well-thought-out decision regarding the ideal role(s) of 
the law professor would be a real possibility, and lawyers would not simply 
be talking past each other as they have been for ages.  This prospect is the 
key benefit that this research offers in addressing the conflict over the 
rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e).  Finally, as the 
practice of collaborative law suggests, this cooperative approach to rhetoric 
would be one that lawyers could rely upon in other situations in their 
professional lives, including negotiation situations. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has explained how alternative rhetorics can offer new 
possibilities for helping to improve the ongoing conflict over the rhetorical 
persona(e) of the U.S. law professor.  To do so, the Article addressed 
invitational rhetoric at the levels of theory and application.  Moving forward 
but still drawing upon invitational rhetoric, the Article addressed 
cooperative rhetoric at a level of theory, as having precedent in 
collaborative law, and at a level of application in the specific conflict. 
The many lawyers whose rhetoric received consideration in the 
precursor to this Article
185
 have illustrated how communication is not a 
perfect idea.  As John Durham Peters envisioned the concept, 
communication is “the project of reconciling self and other.”
186
  
Communication usually involves two or more parties, the self and other(s), 
who often have differing views of the world.  Because life is complex, 
thinking that better communicating will resolve communication problems is 
problematic.
187
  Indeed, a standard of perfection is too high because humans 
“can never communicate like the angels.”
188 
Nonetheless, human communicators do not have to be “lonely zombies 
searching for soul mates,”
189
 nor do they have to be over-zealous advocates 
who refuse to listen to each other. The prospect of imperfect 
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communication, which often involves relying on “faith and risk,”
190
 is still a 
possibility.  Alternative approaches to communication like cooperative 
rhetoric are examples of this.  Part of cooperative rhetoric is invitational 
rhetoric, through which rhetors take the risk that co-rhetors may decline 
invitations.  However, another possibility of invitational rhetoric is that 
rhetors take the chance that co-rhetors may accept invitations and new 
relationships may develop.  Viewpoints may be different and even hard to 
understand, yet the opportunity for positive communication remains.  This 
possibility is an important promise of invitational rhetoric.  Placed in 
conversation with a respectful version of the more traditional Aristotelian 
understanding of rhetoric, invitational rhetoric can function within a 
dynamic dialectic that becomes cooperative rhetoric.  Individuals can take 
the chance that cooperative rhetoric will open new doors to imperfect, but 
positive, communication.  At a minimum, the persona(e) of the law 
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